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Leveraged Buyouts
in the Hospitality Industry:
Five Years Later
by
Elisa S. Moncarz
Associate Professor
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School of Hospitality Management

When the author wrote her first artide for the FIU Hospitalii Review on leveraged buyouts' some five years ago, this business strategy was beginning to
enjoy increasingpqulatity. S i m that time leveraged buyouts grew to unprecedented levels both in number and size of transactions. However, following the
failure of the UAL proposal and the collapse of the junk bond market in 1989,
there has been a marked slowdown in buyout activity. lhis article examines
major developments affecting leveraged buyouts over the past five years and
addresses their future implications for the haspitalily industry.

The merits and demerits of leveraged buyouts (hereafter LBOs)
became one of the hottest topics of discussion and debate in the 1980s.
Indeed, the 1980s may be remembered as the "decade of the LBOs,"
commencing with returns well over 40 percent to LBO participants
and ending with the collapse of the junk bond market and the financial troubles experienced by, Carnpeau and Resorts International.
The term LBO has been used in a variety of ways. It generally
refers to an acquiror, which often includes the incumbent management of the acquired company (i.e., management buyouts or MBOs)
taking a company (or division of a company) private by purchasing
all the outstanding equity with significant amount of debt financing
backed by the company's assets. In essence, the transaction involves
the substitution of debt for equity, and, thus, the resulting private
firm is said to be "highly leveraged." This huge amount of debt is
expected to be serviced by a combination of operating income and
asset dispositions (e.g., selling restaurant divisions or hotel properties to other companies).
A Typical LBO Has Three Main Constituencies:
management of the company which acquires the company,
division, or subsidiary it is currently managing, thereby
entering the world of entrepreneurship. These individuals will
hold a significant equity stake in the company after the buyout
is completed.
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buyout specialists (such as Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts and
Company or Fortsmann, Little and Co.) that sponsors the
going-private transaction while counseling and monitoring the
LBO company after the buyout. "The LBO specialist arranges
the debt and equity financing necessary to purchase t h e
common stock held by the public and serves a s a financial
adviser and director of the post-buyout private c~rporation."~
lenders or institutional investors who purchase equity and
lend money to finance the transaction.

These ownership structures of LBOs are designed both to protect
the parties who have provided the required financing and to improve
manager's incentives and implement strategic changes, hence,
enhancing the company's performance. Accordingly, a n LBO firm
would normally expect another restructuring within several years by
selling the company back to the public or a third party.
One of the contributing factors to the LBO popularity is that
major participants stand to gain by the transaction, as follows:
Selling public shareholders receive a premium over the market
value of the stock.
Management acquires ownership of a company it is already
running and the opportunity to enhance its value and thus
receive future rewards directly from its efforts.
Lending institutions receive a high yield investment and a new
client with the incentive to grow.
LBOs Have Experienced Major Growth in the Past Decade
Although LBOs have been in existence since the 1960s, not until
the '80s did they become a quantitatively significant component of
overall merger and acquisition activity. "The number of going private
transactions in 1988 was nearly eight times that of 1979."3
"The recessionary periods of the '70s and early '80s prompted
~
the sale of many companies, divisions and s ~ b s i d i a r i e s . "With
ever-increasing pressure t o remain competitive a n d t o use
resources more effectively, hospitality companies had to reasses
their competitive strategy, thereby contributing to the LBO boom
of the 1980s. Moreover, a very favorable economic environment in
the mid and late '80s, accompanied by rising stock prices, facilitated the sale of companies a t a higher price while carrying a
heavy debt load.
The LBO phenomenon experienced in the 1980s was also the
result of favorable tax laws. Three tax incentives have been proposed
as important sources of wealth gains in LBOs: "the tax deductibility
of interest payments on corporate debt, increased depreciation
deductions associated with the step-up of assets (especially significant before the Tax Reform Act of 1986), and the tax advantages of
Employee Stock Option Plans (ESOP)."5
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A new theory was presented by Margaret Mendenhall Blair, a
research associate a t the Brookings Institute, concerning the
reasons for the LBO boom of the 1980s. Blair contends that "the
upsurge of real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates in the '80s to
unprecedented levels coincided with declines of rate of returns of
physical assets. The high real interest rates sharply cut the
number of investment projects by raising the hurdle rate and
resulted in more cash flows that managers could invest intern a l l ~ . "Accordingly,
~
this triggered stockholders' dissatisfaction
and stepped up pressures on corporate managers to increase the
payout to shareholders.
Media Attention Is Focused on LBOs in the Late '80s
The news media, Congress, and the regulatory community
focused considerable attention on LBOs during 1988 and 1989
(especially in the airline industry) "because of the use of this
financing arrangement to fund corporate takeover^."^ This interest
was heightened by the size and volume of many LBOs, culminating
with the $25.3 billion paid for RJR Nabisco in 1988.
On the face of it, "LBOs became a stock market game in which
nearly everyone seemed to win, whether the manager-entrepreneur
buying its own business, the shareholders receiving a premium for
their stock ownership or the investment bankers overseeing the
~rocess."~
In the second half of the decade the development of the junk
bond market, i.e, high risk, high yielding corporate bonds, opened
another audience of investors since they provided a major portion of
the financing for LBOs in the late 1980s. As a result, the junk bond
market further focused concern on the major risk factors inherent to
LBOs. Junk bonds offered investors higher yields because their
issues were considered less able to meet their obligations that were
more established borrowers.
Many observers contend that LBOs perform a useful and
perhaps necessary function in downsizing companies (especially
conglomerates) that have been too large, too bureaucratic, and inefficient in using their resources. Carl Icahn, a well-known corporate
raider, noted that " LBOs and takeovers are part of a free-market
response working to unseat corporate bureaucracies, control costs,
and make America more c~mpetitive."~
Several analysts refer to a theory of corporate finance that
shows how the distinction between ownership and control can have
important implications for the performance of a firm. As this distinction becomes less clear, the conflict of interest between owners and
managers becomes less severe. Since in many LBOs the manager
becomes the owner, the consequences of managerial actions are
entirely internalized by the firm's capital reorganization. In this
manner, "by improving the organizational efficiency of the firm
through a change of ownership the LBO can increase the firm's
earnings."lo
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Michael C. Jensen noted in a recent article published by
Harvard Business Review that "the emerging private organizations
that resulted from the takeover and LBO activity of the '80s were
making remarkable gains in operating efficiencies, employee productivity, and shareholders' value."" Consistent with modern finance
theory, the private organizations are not managing to maximize
earnings per share but rather to maximize value."12 Jensen further
noted that "over the long term, LBOs enhance U.S. economic performance relative to our most formidable competitor, Japan."13
Other proponents of LBOs argue t h a t they are justified on
economic fundamentals since "they would bring tremendous
benefits to the American economy, a s managers, driven by the
need to service a n d pay debt, employ corporate assets more
efficiently, or sell them to those that
Another proponent argued, "By placing ownership in t h e
hands of a small group of investors and managers with powerful
debt-driven incentives to improve productivity, companies can't
help but shape up."15
Others Have a Different View Concerning LBOs.
LBOs have been the subject of intense criticism and public
debate. Many critics have expressed concern about the potential
risks associated with LBOs. These concerns have been predicated
implicitly on the notion that changes in the firm's financial structure have no positive real effects on the firm's output since a postbuyout firm must direct its funds to meet growing debt service
instead of investing them in research and development or expansionary activities ( a major ingredient for success in the hospitality
industry). Indeed, the reduction in research and development and
capital expenditures leaves the LBO company poorly positioned
for the future.
Moreover, the LBO will leave the firm more vulnerable to
future economic downturns, and the rise in interest rates will
place ensuing pressure on cash flows, perhaps jeopardizing the
firm's existence.
Many are also alarmed about the social value of LBOs. These
doubts stem from the bad effects of wealth distributions, increased
instability of the economy, and possible loss to society. A typical
post-buyout s t r a t e g y i s t o c u t costs i n o r d e r t o i n c r e a s e
profitability a n d e n s u r e t h a t t h e company c a n m e e t d e b t
payments. This results in t h e layoff of employees, closing of
divisions, and reduction of expenditures on research, development,
and expansionary activities. "For example, Safeway Stores 1986
LBO would seem to be the model buyout in terms of productivity
and operating profits. Yet, a two-month investigation revealed
enormous human costs. The company dropped ten of thousands of
employees from its payroll. Moreover, many employees found the
post-buyout working environment more difficult with its high
pressure quota systems.16
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LBOs May Have Positive Impact On Shareholders
There is empirical evidence that suggests that LBOs have had
positive effects on the target firm's stock prices. Lehn and Poulsen
found that the "cumulative daily abnormal returns from 20 days
before to 20 days after the LBO announcement averaged 20.54
percent across the firms included in a sample during the period
1980-1987."17Similarly, Torabzadeh a n d Bertin found t h a t
"announcements of LBOs have significant positive effects on the
target firm's stock prices based on a study of 48 LBOs occurring from
1982 to 1985."lRThe empirical observation that the purchase price of
an LBO is on the average considerably higher than the market price
before an LBO announcement suggests that these transactions have
increased the firm's value and, hence, shareholders' wealth.
The issue of whether LBOs are productive has also received attention from researchers. Several recent studies of post buyout performance provide evidence suggesting that these transactions on the
average have actually improved the firm's performance. For example,
'Yago reports one study's findings that target firms of management
buyouts are less likely to close plants that are other firms."lg
A study by Steven Kaplan provides evidence t h a t "LBOs
increase operating efficiency without massive layoffs or big cuts in
research and development. A sample of 48 larger MBOs completed
between 1980 and 1986 experienced average operating income
increases of 42 percent from the year prior to the buyout to the third
year after the buyout. At the same time, cash flow increased by 96
percent during the same period."20
A study by Abbie Smith provided further support that significant increases in operating returns resulted from management
incentive^."^' Smith's study comprised 58 MBOs completed during
the period 1977 and 1986. Palmeri also found that "the stocks of 70
LBO target firms that subsequently went public performed significantly better than the market since the public offering."22
In a 1989 study of financial performance, Pound and Gordon
found that firms issuing high-yield securities experienced increases
in cash flow, earnings, dividend payments, and sales. Long-term and
short-term growth also irnpr~ved."~~
LBO Activity Has Effect on Industry
The prevalance of LBOs in the hospitality industry during the
1980s has changed the structure of the industry (especially the food
service industry) and is expected to have a long-term powerful
impact on its hture.
Table 1 shows the LBO activity in the hospitality industry from
1984 to 1989. Although the lodging or airline segments of the
industry did not actively participate in the LBO craze of the middle
and late '80s, the airline industry had three major and highly-publicized proposed buyouts in 1989 (i.e, United Airlines, American
Airlines, and NWA). Yet, only one, NWA, was actually consummated,
becoming the "largest buyout of 1989."
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Table 1
LBOs in the Hospitality Industry 1984-1989
Year

Number of Transactions

!

1

Food Lodging
service

I

Airline

Mean Value*
(in millions)

Total Value*
(in millions)

!

Source: Mergers and Acquisitions, 1984-1990.
* Several divisional LBOs did not disclose dollar value.

It is evident from Table 1that most of the LBO activity occurred
in the food service industry, pealung in 1988. "All LBO activity centers
around companies with strong, stable, and growing cash flows and the
restaurant industry provides that." 24 However, the largest LBOs in the
food service industry took place in 1984 and 1985. The mean value of
LBOs went down aRer 1985 because there were smaller companies or
divisions of larger companies going private during those years.
Nonetheless, there was a dramatic increase in the mean and total
value of LBO activity in 1989 as a result of two major LBOs completed
in that year (i.e., NWA and TW Services).
Table 2 shows the five largest LBOs in the hospitality industry
between 1984 and 1989. The two largest LBOs were consummated in
1989. A brief review of the five largest LBOs follows.
1989 Marks Three Large LBOs

NWA Inc., parent of Northwest Airlines, became "the largest
LBO negotiated during 1989."z5The $3.58 billion buyout was led by
a n investor group t h a t included former Marriott executives,
Frederick Malek, Alfred Checci, and Gary Wilson. The LBO was
financed entirely by equity investment and bank loans, thereby not
including junk bonds. In June 1990 Frederick B. Rechtschler was
named president and chief executive officerz6and NWA announced
plans "to spend $422 million improving its food, upgrading i t s
aircraft interiors and retraining its employee^."^^
As of March 1990 "NWA reduced its $3.35 billion in debt to $2.1
billion, placing it in a better position than a number of other airlines.
But, NWA still faces some financial hurdles that have been raised a
little higher by the crisis in the Persian G ~ l f . " ~ '
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Table 2
The Five Largest LBOs in the Hospitality lndustry
(1984-1989)

Year

1.1989
2.1989
3.1984
4. 1985
5.1989

Company

Industry
Segment

NWA

Airline
Food service
Food service
Lodging
Lodging

TW Services
ARA Services
Motel 6
Days Inn

Total Value
(in millions)

$3,580.0
1,700.0
882.5
881.5
765.0

TW Services management and Coninston Partners (a New York
investment firm) formed TW Holdings to buy TW Services in 1989.
In acquiring TW Services, the restaurant industry's fourth largest
operator, "Coninston for the first time owned a company, since until
~ ~ nearly nine
then it usually had been a major s h a r e h ~ l d e r . "For
months between mid-1988 and 1989, Coninston was rentless in its
chase of TW Services. Finally in December 1989, Coninston
completed the LBO "by restructuring an original deal based on junk
bonds whereby Coninston was forced to invest more equity and rely
more heavily on bank loans."30
Since the buyout, TW Services has been selling a number of nonstrategic subsidiaries for the express purpose of reducing debt. Yet,
"TW Services flagship operations (i.e., Denny's and Canteen) have
been infused with expansion and remodeling dollars."31
In its fiscal year 1989, TW Services lost $57.3 million (on a 5
percent increase in revenues to $3.4 billion) due to interest costs and
the loss of feeding contracts a t defense and auto plants."32"In the
third quarter ending September 30, 1990, TW Services reported a
$3.3 million loss compared to $44.2 million loss in the preceding
year's quarter, after writing down $60 million in non-recurring
related expenses."33
In December 1984, ARA Services (a Philadelpia-based contract
feeder) was bought by a management-led buyout team for $882.5
million as a means to protect A M from takeover efforts of various
potential bidders. "ARA's selling shareholders received $71.75 a
share, a windfall considering AFW's selling price before takeover talk
was in the m i d - $ 4 0 ~ . "As
~ ~a result, the members of management
who participated in the LBO attained "31 percent ownership of the
company, putting up 2 percent of the capital and borrowing the rest
against ARA's assets."35
"In just a few months after the buyout, AFW reduced its total
debt by $41 million (from just over $1 billion, including $150 million
in loans before the
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"In January 1990, ARA redeemed all its 16.5 percent subordinated debt at par by borrowing $151.7 million under a credit facility.
Additionally, in April 1990 the company issued, through a private
placement, $125 million of 12 percent subordinated debt due in
2000."37ARA Services ranked number one among contract feeders in
both 1989 and 1990 by number of U.S. units and number three by
systemwide sales, according to Nation's Restaurant News Survey.38
Motel 6, the nation's largest economy chain, went private in
February 1985 in a $881 million LBO (including $125 million equity
and $756 debt) orchestrated by Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, and
Company and a new management team. In October 1986,"15 percent
of Motel 6 went public through a master limited partnership (equity
investors still owned 52 percent)."39
In July 1990 Motel 6 agreed to be acquired by French-based hotel
giant Accor S.A. for $1.3 billion in cash. "Investors who paid $13.50 a
unit when the public offering was completed in 1986 will nearly double
their money in four years."40Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, and Company
and other participating investors "will receive a return of five times
their original investment of $125 million."41Helped by a radio advertising campaign, Motel 6 increased its occupancy rates to an average of
77 percent (from 67 percent) and expanded to 64,000 rooms (from
42,000 rooms) between 1984 and 1989.
Tollman Hundley Corporation (Days Inn's largest franchisee)
acquired Days Inn of America for $765 million in 1989 ($90 million in
cash and the assumption of $675 million debt). As of November 1990,
"Days Inn has total long-term debt of $744 million, all but $5 million of
which was inherited from the Days Inn's previous owner, Reliance
Group Holdings, Inc. (Reliance took Days Inn private in 1988)."42
As of this writing, Days Inn Corporation is saddled with large,
high-interest debt and has missed some repayments. It is trying to
overhaul its capital structure. "Days Inn's two primary problems are
the average interest rate on the high-risk, high-yield debt Gunk
bonds) is extraordinary high (i.e., 14 percent) and most of the debt is
due for repayment in the next few years. The company is in default
on a total of $355 million of long-term, privately-placed debt."43AS a
result, Moody's Investor Services lowered Days Inn's subordinated
debt ratings from Ca to Caa.
LBOs Produced Conglomerates in Food Service Industry
The wave of LBOs and takeovers has reshaped the food service
industry in recent years and has produced a number of restaurant
conglomerates, among them American Restaurant Group, Paragon
Restaurants, TW Services, and Restaurant Enterprises.
American Restaurant Group comprises the former Saga Corporation Restaurant group (e.g., Grandy's, Black Angus, and Velvet
Turtle). "The LBO was completed in 1987 by former W.R. Grace
Restaurant chief executive Anwar Soliman and his partners, who
paid an estimated $275 million to buy the group from Marriott
Corporation upon its acquisition of Saga."44
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Paragon Restaurants, formerly Vicorp Specialty Restaurant
Group, was formed in 1986 "when Vicorp Chainnan Gordon Miles
and a top management team completed the divisional LBO of Vicorp
Specialty Restaurants, a subsidiary of Vicorp C ~ r p . "Paragon
~~
Restaurant Group comprises 54 Hungry Hungerhlountain Jacks
Steak Houses, 33 Rusty Pelican Restaurants (acquired in 1987), and
16-unit Carlos Murphy's Restaurants. In 1990 "a Japanese restaurant company, Kyotaru Co. Ltd., agreed to buy the Paragon Steak
House units."46
TW Services, formerly a wholly-owned subsidiary of Transworld
Corp., acquired Denny's for $843 million in 1987. As a result, TW
Services operates some of the best-known food service concepts in the
industry, including Canteen (the nation's second contract feeder),
Denny's (the largest family-style restaurant), S p a r t a n Foods
(operator of Hardee units and owner of Quincy steak chain), and El
Pollo Loco (quick-service chicken chain).
After acquiring Denny's in 1987, including the assumption of $625
million debt remaining from Denny's 1985 LBO, "TW Services
intended to maximize cash flow by rapidly expanding Denny's and El
Pollo Loco chains through franchising and upgrading Denny's service,
menu, and
In December 1989 a New York investment firm,
Coninston Partners, completed t h e LBO of TW Services, t h u s
becoming one of the nation's largest food service operators. In 1990 TW
Services commenced a consolidation of its $3.7 billion empire.
Restaurant Enterprises Group comprises the former W.R. Grace
Restaurant Company and its extensive dinner house holdings. In
1986 W.R. Grace Company, needing capital in order to buy back its
stock, sold a 51 percent stake in W.R. Grace full-service restaurant
division to a management-led buyout group for $580 million. "The
group, spearheaded initially by Anwar Soliman, the vice-president of
W.R. Grace Restaurant division, and eventually completed by
Norman Habermann, acquired W.R. Grace full-service restaurants,
including El Torito, Houlihans, Carrows, and C o ~ o ' s . " ~ ~
Some Hospitality Firms Experienced Reverse LBOs
Public companies t h a t go private via a n LBO can typically
expect another restructuring within three to five years after the
buyout. A reverse LBO indicates t h a t the firm became (or was
acquired) by a publicly-held company. This is especially important for
capital intensive companies since it is very difficult to remain private
for a n extended period of time as a result of the constant pressure of
high debt.
Starting in 1986 several LBOs completed in the early or middle
'80s began to cash in, thereby taking fkll advantage of the high stock
prices that prevailed in those years. A case in point is Motel 6. Just a
year after the $881 million LBO completed in 1985, Kohlberg,
Kravis, Roberts, and Company sold 15 percent of the company to the
public for $13.50 a unit using the master limited partnership vehicle
while keeping control of the company.
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Another company able to cash in returning huge earnings to the
LBO participants was Foodmaker, Inc., the parent of the Jack-in-theBox fast-food chain. In 1985 an investment group led by Foodmaker's
president and chief executive officer Jack Goodall bought the division
from Ralston Purina for $430 million. In early 1987 "Foodmaker sold
four million shares to the public a t $13.50 each, thereby tripling the
market value of t h e equity stake of t h e the LBO partners."4g
However, late in 1988, Foodmaker decided to go private again in a
new management-led LBO for $247 million. According to Jack
Goodall, "The market has undervalued Foodmaker stock prices in
spite of the big success experienced by Jack-in-the-Box with new
product offerings and impressive sales growth. Investors continued
to back away from Foodmaker because of its alarming 5 to 1debt to
equity ratio helped by its purchase of Chi-Chi's Mexican restaurant
chain in April 1988 for $235 million."s0
Future Outlook Is Cloudy For LBOs
After an unprecedented wave of LBOs in the '80s, 1989 "may be
remembered more for the deals that failed, especially the $6.79
billion proposed managemenuunion led buyout of UAL, parent of
United Airlines, that, according to many analysts, triggered the
mini-stock crash of October 1989."'l
The collapse of the junk bond market made it increasingly difficult for buyouts to raise capital. This resulted in many deals falling
apart and being in need of restructuring (e.g., TW Services). "Only 16
LBOs valued over $10 million were completed in the first quarter of
1990 in all industries, a 71 percent drop from the 56 completed in the
first quarter of 1989."52
Moreover, more and more LBOs are running into financial trouble.
As a result, lenders are becoming increasingly wary of financing highlyleveraged transactions, and many back away from LBO lending.
Deleveraging has become trendy in the 1990s. When LBO funds try to
cash out by selling the company, they often can't get top prices.
Some LBOs fell in default on loan agreements because of
decreasing profitability. As an example, Service America, the number
four contract feeder in the nation, defaulted on a $195 million loan from
General Electric Credit Corporation, the senior creditor on the $500
management-led buyout completed in 1987. In June 1990, Service
America informed the SEC "that as a result of posting no earnings for
the fiscal year 1990 (violating terms of the loan agreement), the
company was to submit a restructuring plan that included a new bond
offering on the company's $127 million subordinated debenture^."^^
Service America's "financial health was adversely affected by
three events: the near collapse of the high interest-high yield junk
bond market, the plant closings and layoffs among customers in the
auto and defense industries where Service America had major
contracts, and a charge related to the relocation of offices and severance pay needed to satisfy contracts of employees that were let go
after the LBO.""
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In spite of the slowdown in LBO activity, an article published in
The New York rimes on November 23,1990, reported that "two major
LBO specialists (Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, and Company and Fortsmann, Little and Co.) are trying to persuade pension funds and other
institutional investors to replenish their funds so that they can buy
~~
future deals are expected to require
more ~ o m p a n i e s . "However,
more equity financing, thereby reducing the astronomical returns of
the past decade.
Increased Corporate Debt Might Increase Future Recessions
The proliferation of LBOs and other highly-leveraged transactions during the past decade has added debt to the financial system.
Because of this increased debt burden, a major future concern is
"that bankruptcy and near-bankruptcy of LBOs and other heavily
indebted firms might increase the severity of a future (or perhaps
current) recession caused by factors other than the debt."56That is,
the bankruptcy risk will probably contribute to the severity of a
given recession. Indeed, the bankruptcy filings of Campeau and
Resorts International has raised anxieties about what will happen to
the economy if the LBOs of the 1980s should crash in the 1990s.
"During the past decade, debt as a percentage of total capital has
grown from 34 to 49 percent (at non-financial companies) whereas
interest coverage has decreased 4.6 to 3.3 times."57"In dollar terms,
corporations took on $700 billion of additional debt from 1984 to
Analysts at Moody's
1988, with total debt rising to $1.9 trilli~n."~'
Investors Services forecast that defaults will rise about 10 percent on
junk bond issuers in 1990 without forecasting recession. "The total
dollar value of all these defaults would be approximately $20 billion,
a figure that does not include the enormous costs of bankruptcy."5g
Nonetheless, Michael Jensen contends that critics of leverage
fail to appreciate "that insolvency in and of itself is not always
something to avoid and that the costs of becoming insolvent are
likely to be much smaller in the new world of high leverage than in
the old world of equity-dominated balance sheets."60
'There Are Lessons to be Learned From LBOs
As the 1990s begin, the future climate of LBOs looks uncertain.
Higher debt burdens of the past decade, better known as the
"excesses of the 1980s," suggest increased risk of financial failure
and could exacerbate the severity of a future (or ongoing) recession
or slowdown in economic activity. Indeed, the market has curbed
buyout activity as the classic LBO loses its luster due to the collapse
of the junk bond market while emitting dangers of sending companies into bankruptcy.
The role of corporate debt has long been debated. Critics contend
that growing indebtedness has hobbled companies and robbed them of
their future. Conversely, the LBO activity of the past decade provides a
good illustration of how management can generate higher productivity
gains, and magnification of returns on investment, at the expense of
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subjecting the firm to greater financial risk. Indeed, empirical
research, though preliminary, demonstrates that LBOs have provided
beneficial contributions to corporations and the economy.
In a book published by the Oxford University Press in early
1991, Glenn Yago states "that by relying on factual data instead of
rhetoric we can demystify LBOs and focus our attention on the
significant variations among them."61In so doing, we can identify
those factors of financial management structure in LBOs that
optimize their social, economic, and financial impact.
There might be fewer LBOs in the 1990s, yet alternative vehicles
that emulate the benefits of the LBO insofar as productivity gains
should replace the classic LBO. The real challenge to the hospitality
industry is to design innovative ways that provide management incentives more nearly as they are in LBOs, keeping in proper perspective
the entrepreneurial spirit that will always be present in the industry.
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